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CONSTRUCTING THE ORIGINAL SCOPE OF
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
Nathan S. Chapman*
INTRODUCTION
A number of scholars have questioned the utility of originalist methods for
answering constitutional questions sounding in foreign affairs.1 Questions
about the territorial and personal scope of constitutional rights are said to be
especially hard because the U.S. Constitution provides few clues about how
to understand its relationship to background law of other nations and
common law norms about legislative and judicial jurisdiction.2 In the words
of Ingrid Wuerth, no one has yet explained “why, how, and what kind of
history is relevant” for answering such questions.3 Nevertheless, legal
scholars persistently write papers on the original history of the Constitution
and foreign affairs, not for the sake of so-called pure historical inquiry, but
to help answer contemporary constitutional questions.4
Wuerth’s recent paper, The Due Process and Other Constitutional Rights
of Foreign Nations, is “Exhibit A.”5 She relies on conventional legal
materials and forms of reasoning to argue that Article III and the Due Process
Clause protect the notice and personal jurisdiction rights of foreign states.6
*

Associate Professor, University of Georgia School of Law. Thanks to the editors at Fordham
for asking me to write this response. Thanks also to Will Baude, Jud Campbell, Harlan Cohen,
Bill Dodge, and Ingrid Wuerth for commenting on earlier drafts.
1. See generally Ingrid Wuerth, An Originalism for Foreign Affairs?, 53 ST. LOUIS. U.
L.J. 5 (2008) [hereinafter Wuerth, Originalism]; Eugene Kontorovich, Originalism and the
Difficulties of History in Foreign Affairs, 53 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 39 (2008).
2. See Andrew Kent, The New Originalism and the Foreign Affairs Constitution, 82
FORDHAM L. REV. 757, 762 (2013).
3. Wuerth, Originalism, supra note 1, at 8.
4. See, e.g., AMANDA L. TYLER, HABEAS CORPUS IN WARTIME: FROM THE TOWER OF
LONDON TO GUANTANAMO BAY (2017); MICHAEL W. MCCONNELL, THE PRESIDENT WHO
WOULD NOT BE KING (manuscript on file with author); ANTHONY J. BELLIA JR. & BRADFORD
R. CLARK, THE LAW OF NATIONS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION (2017); MICHAEL D.
RAMSEY, THE CONSTITUTION’S TEXT IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS (2007); Nathan S. Chapman, Due
Process of War, 94 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 639 (2018); Gregory Ablavsky, “With the Indian
Tribes”: Race, Citizenship, and Original Constitutional Meanings, 70 STAN. L. REV. 1025
(2018); Sarah H. Cleveland & William S. Dodge, Defining and Punishing Offenses Under
Treaties, 124 YALE L.J. 2202 (2015); Ingrid Wuerth, The Captures Clause, 76 U. CHI. L. REV.
1683 (2009); Andrew Kent, A Textual and Historical Case Against a Global Constitution, 95
GEO. L.J. 463 (2007).
5. See generally Ingrid Wuerth, The Due Process and Other Constitutional Rights of
Foreign Nations, 88 FORDHAM L. REV 633 (2019).
6. See generally id.
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Yet she provides no description or defense of her methodology.7 Without
passing on her conclusions, this brief essay offers a qualified defense of
scholarly (and judicial) attempts to construct the original territorial and
personal scope (or domain) of constitutional rights.
As to “why history is relevant,” the answer is simple: perhaps the only
matter of consensus in the contemporary practice of American constitutional
law is that the text of the Constitution is the source of that law. Partly through
the influence of originalism, American constitutional scholars and jurists
have grown more sensitive to the importance of historical context for
understanding the meaning of that text.8 Wuerth (and many other foreign
affairs scholars) take this for granted, but it seems worth making explicit.
As to “how” and “what kind of history,” the answer, as Wuerth and others
have shown, is far more challenging. The late eighteenth-century legal
ecosystem—the relationships among the customary law of nations, treaties,
statutes, the common law, and the Constitution—was vastly different than
our own. This is especially the case for the scope of constitutional rights.
This response argues that Wuerth’s paper illustrates the most persuasive way
to go about the task—one question at a time, with an emphasis on
conventional legal materials and forms of argumentation. Some questions
will call for especially imaginative constructions. This does not render them
irrelevant, but it does caution some modesty about the extent to which they
ought to trump competing constructions arising from practice and precedent.
Despite her reluctance, then, Wuerth’s methods are entirely consistent with
a confident originalism.
I. WHY HISTORY?
Wuerth’s question is whether foreign states, as litigants in federal court,
are entitled to separation of powers and due process protections, in particular
the requirements of personal jurisdiction and notice. To answer the question,
she turns to constitutional text and history. She provides little defense of this
approach, especially considering her prior concerns about it. Moreover, the
move is arguably unnecessary to resolve her question. This Part first explains
why it is not obvious that the history is necessary and then explains why it is.
A. An Argument Without History
The doctrinal problem Wuerth seeks to resolve is the product of an
unreflective interpretation of the word “person” in the Due Process Clause.
The U.S. Supreme Court has held that the word does not refer to U.S. states,9

7. See generally id.
8. See generally RAMSEY, supra note 4, at 2 (“[T]hrough close attention to the
Constitution’s language and the historical and linguistic context in which it was written, we
can uncover the text’s basic foreign affairs structure as it was designed and understood in the
founding era.”); Kent, supra note 2. (discussing the challenges new originalism faces in the
foreign affairs context).
9. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 323 (1966).
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and it has declined to decide whether it refers to foreign states.10 On this
basis, lower courts have held that the Clause does not protect them.11
Quite apart from history, this interpretation of the Fifth Amendment seems
wrong. First, common sense: the modern default rule is that foreign states
are entitled to immunity from suit for their governmental acts (without their
consent) but not for their nongovernmental acts. For governmental acts, at
least, why would the alternative to immunity be vulnerability to judgment
without basic norms of fairness? The greater privilege (immunity) would
seem to imply the lesser rights (notice and basic fairness). And if states’ acts
are nongovernmental, why would they be entitled to lesser protection than
foreign corporations? The contrary position—that foreign states that are, for
whatever reason, not immune from suit may nevertheless be subject to
judgment without notice and personal jurisdiction—would be an aberration.
Second, the modern doctrinal ground for the notion that foreign states are
not entitled to notice and personal jurisdiction is dubious. The Supreme
Court has never decided the issue. Lower courts have concluded that foreign
states are not “persons” under the Due Process Clause, and therefore outside
its protection,12 because the Supreme Court, in South Carolina v.
Katzenbach,13 held that U.S. states are not such “persons.”14 But the holding
in Katzenbach can hardly be taken at face value. What the Court rejected
was the notion that the Voting Rights Act violated a state’s due process rights
by regulating its elections without prior judicial oversight.15 The Court’s
holding was probably right, but for the wrong reason. The case implicated
South Carolina’s relative sovereignty, not its “life, liberty, or property.” The
Due Process Clause was simply irrelevant. The Court was quite right when
it said that “[t]he objections to the Act which are raised under these
provisions [including the Due Process Clause] may therefore be considered
only as additional aspects of the basic question presented by the case: Has
Congress exercised its powers under the Fifteenth Amendment in an
appropriate manner in relation to the States?”16 The case should be
understood to have no implications when what is at stake is a foreign (or
U.S.) state’s property interests.
Yet to resolve this puzzle, Wuerth turns to the historical sources. That they
would yield an answer is not obvious. Her question is in some respects
deeply anachronistic—exactly the kind that creates a puzzle for historical
sources. During the early republic, a foreign state would rarely, if ever, have
been a party to a suit in federal court without its consent. A foreign state’s
vessels and cargo were subject to condemnation as war prizes under the law
of nations, but that law exempted the sovereign’s person (and ambassadors)
from the jurisdiction of another state’s courts. In my view, the fact that prize
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 619 (1992).
See Frontera Res. Azer. Corp. v. State Oil Co. 582 F.3d 393, 399 (2d Cir. 2009).
Id.
383 U.S. 301 (1966).
Id. at 323.
See id.
Id. at 324.
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cases proceeded according to municipal law and traditional admiralty
procedures is powerful evidence that a foreign state—when subject to a U.S.
court’s jurisdiction—would have been entitled to traditional notice and due
process.17 But it does not show that a state would have been subject to
jurisdiction without its consent. If a state did consent to suit, however, such
consent would have guaranteed jurisdiction and customary notice. So
Wuerth’s questions would rarely, if ever, have arisen. They arise now
because Congress has eliminated sovereign immunity in some cases,
meaning that foreign states can be haled into court without their consent,
giving rise to the question of personal jurisdiction.
So why turn to this seemingly moribund past for answers to contemporary
legal problems? The only defense Wuerth offers for her methodology is that
constitutional text and history are “fruitful avenues of inquiry because they
yield straightforward and sensible answers to modern questions about the
constitutional status of foreign states.”18 With respect, I think this misses the
point. If the answers are straightforward and sensible, then why look to
history for them? We could have come up with them ourselves, and the fact
that they are straightforward and sensible would simply be a mark in their
favor, to be weighed against their costs. In any case, this is not much of a
justification in light of her own prior concerns about originalist methods for
answering foreign affairs questions.19 Her methodology deserves a better
defense.
B. Why History
The best defense is (perhaps frustratingly) simple:
American
constitutional decision-makers privilege the text of the Constitution when
answering a constitutional question, and they rely on historical context to
ascertain the text’s meaning. Why?
The short answer is that they do so because they do (and in fact always
have). As the judge in Auden’s poem unsatisfyingly insisted, “let me explain
it once more, Law is The Law.”20
This circularity does not mean the practice is arbitrary. There is a good
reason for it. The Constitution is a text. American lawyers have always
privileged the constitutional text over any other sources of constitutional law.
If there is any issue to take with Justice Jackson’s bon mot, it is that the most
“fixed star in our constitutional constellation” has nothing to do with political

17. See generally Nathan S. Chapman, Due Process Abroad, 112 NW. U.L. REV 377
(2017).
18. See Wuerth, supra note 5, at 636–37.
19. Elsewhere she has argued that “[h]istory is essential to understanding the relationship
between executive authority and war and the struggle and acquiescence of Congress vis-à-vis
the President,” ostensibly because of “the lack of judicial opinions in this area.” Wuerth,
Originalism, supra note 1, at 27. But again, this presumes rather than explains the salience of
history for constitutional construction.
20. W.H. Auden, Law Like Love, in AUDEN POEMS 87 (Edward Mendelson ed., 1991).
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orthodoxy or officials high or petty—it is rather that the Constitution is the
Constitution.21
And words have meaning. Even the words that comprise laws.
Originalists have not sufficiently explored the distinction between written
laws (and among them, perhaps, constitutions) and other genres of texts, but
they are quite right that words have meaning, and they gain that meaning
from context, namely from contemporaneous usage by relevant communities.
What makes laws unique is that their meaning depends upon their application
to past, present, and future events beyond the text. In this sense, the meanings
of laws are always protean. But this does not diminish the importance of
their words, or the historical usage of those words, for construing the legal
principle they should be understood to embody.
American lawyers have always applied this sensibility about the
Constitution’s text when attempting to ascertain whether it prohibits or
permits certain conduct. In 1798, Justices Samuel Chase, William Paterson,
and James Iredell all resorted to English constitutional history (among other
things) to ascertain whether the Ex Post Facto Clause applied to noncriminal
cases.22 In 2014, Justice Breyer turned to founding-era sources to conclude
that the Recess Appointments Clause is “ambiguous,” while Justice Scalia,
dissenting, turned to the same sorts of sources to conclude that its meaning
is “plain.”23
And it is not only the Constitution that gets this treatment—it is just that
the Constitution is especially old. Consider also the recent debates about the
meaning of the Alien Tort Statute,24 which was enacted before the Bill of
Rights. The debates focused on the provision’s text and history, not because
the judges and lawyers participating in them were originalists, but because
they were lawyers.25
Just so, the constitutional text and history matter because the American
tradition and system of constitutional law say they matter.26 American law
says other things matter, too—such as subsequent practice and precedent.27
The relative weight of these “modalities” of construction is what theorists
and decision-makers dispute. One need not be an originalist in any strict
sense to accept this; one just need be familiar with the norms of American

21. See W. Va. Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943). For the distinction
between the Constitution and a constitution, see, for example, Mark Tushnett, Constitution, in
THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 217 (2012).
22. See Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386 (1798). Justices Paterson and Iredell also relied on
Blackstone’s definition of an ex post facto law. See id. at 396, 398.
23. NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2568, 2592 (2014).
24. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012).
25. See, e.g., William S. Dodge, The Historical Origins of the Alien Tort Statute: A
Response to the “Originalists,” 19 HAST. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 221 (1996).
26. H. JEFFERSON POWELL, A COMMUNITY BUILT ON WORDS: THE CONSTITUTION IN
HISTORY AND POLITICS 5–6 (2002).
27. See, e.g., PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 12–22 (1991).
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constitutional construction, both historically and today.28 Whether or not
necessary to persuade a particular decision-maker, Wuerth’s resort to the
historical understanding of the constitutional text is at least consistent with
ordinary constitutional decision-making, and, in many cases, for many
decision-makers, central to it.
II. HOW TO CONSTRUCT THE SCOPE OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS?
Wuerth’s argument begins with a careful inquiry into the original meaning
of Article III and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, then
analyzes the implications of that meaning for the litigation rights of foreign
states.29 Throughout, she relies principally on conventional legal materials
and forms of legal reasoning to engage in a close analysis of the meaning of
the constitutional text.30 Although I have questions about some of her
inferences and conclusions, I want to argue that her methodology is generally
spot-on.
First, though the original meaning and scope of constitutional rights are
hard questions for a variety of reasons, the best way to tackle them is
piecemeal, one question at a time, rather than categorically. Second,
Professor Wuerth is right to rely most heavily on materials and forms of
reasoning that would have been familiar to late eighteenth-century legal
decision-makers.
A. One Right at a Time
Originalists today obsess about methodology. Most agree that the object
of constitutional interpretation should be the original meaning of the
Constitution.31 Where a particular provision’s meaning was originally vague
or ambiguous, though, many accept that jurists should “construct” its
applicable principles.32 (Some would also look to subsequent debate and
practice to settle, or “liquidate,” the provision’s meaning.33) Originalists
disagree, however, about the boundaries between “interpretation” and
“construction.” They also disagree about the proper method that jurists
should use to “construct” the meaning of a provision—should they rely
28. This is the case whether one is a constitutional pluralist, see id., or committed to
originalism as the sole mode of constitutional interpretation, see William Baude, Is
Originalism Our Law?, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 2349 (2015).
29. See generally Wuerth, supra note 5, at 653–80.
30. See generally id.
31. See, e.g., ILAN WURMAN, A DEBT AGAINST THE LIVING: AN INTRODUCTION TO
ORIGINALISM 26 (2017); Keith E. Whittington, The New Originalism, 2 GEO. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 599, 599 (2004).
32. See, e.g., Lawrence B. Solum, Intellectual History as Constitutional Theory, 101 VA.
L. REV. 1111, 1122 n.22 (2015) (“If the communicative content is vague or open textured,
then the underdetermination is fixed and constitutional construction will be required to fill in
the legal content of constitutional doctrine.”); KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL
INTERPRETATION: TEXTUAL MEANING, ORIGINAL INTENT, AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 5–14 (1999).
33. See William Baude, Constitutional Liquidation, 71 STAN. L. REV. 1, 13–20 (2019);
Caleb Nelson, Stare Decisis and Demonstrably Erroneous Precedents, 87 VA. L. REV. 1, 10–
21 (2001).
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principally (or exclusively) on original history, or may they resort to modern
moral and political concerns? For originalists, these disputes are grounded
in the original meaning of the text, which may, in at least some cases, permit
or even require a construction that changes over time depending on the
evolution of another area of law (such as international law) or changes in
public morality.
For those committed to approximating an original meaning of the
constitutional text, the construction of rights provisions can be particularly
challenging.34 Some provisions are somewhat easy because they parrot
specific norms from the English constitutional tradition,35 but some are
wholly novel (like the Establishment Clause),36 and others include
innovations unique to the U.S. Constitution (like the Seventh Amendment).37
Still others protect “the” right at issue, perhaps presuming that the original
audience was familiar with its substance and scope, i.e., the First
Amendment’s prohibition on infringing “the freedom of speech, and of the
press.”38
Furthermore, the provisions did not prompt much dispute during drafting
or ratification, so there is less legislative history to illuminate the meaning of
the Bill of Rights than there is for much of the original Constitution.39 Those
who championed the original Constitution believed that a Bill of Rights was
unnecessary, redundant with the Constitution’s provision of limited,
enumerated powers.40 Some large portion of the public probably agreed with
James Madison that the best that could be said for a Bill of Rights was that it
was “neither improper nor altogether useless.”41
If constitutional rights were “simple acknowledged principles” not “of a
doubtful nature,”42 it should be easy to ascertain their original meaning. Yet
scholars have gone back and forth on the original meaning of virtually every
single one of the provisions. As Jud Campbell has recently suggested in a
series of articles, the historical materials may be especially hard for modern
lawyers to assess because late eighteenth-century American conceptions of
rights and, relatedly, judicial review, were dramatically different than the

34. For one of the more influential approaches to the topic, see generally AKHIL REED
AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION (1998).
35. See, e.g., William J. Stuntz, The Substantive Origins of Criminal Procedure, 105 YALE
L.J. 393 (1995); Michael W. McConnell, Tradition and Constitutionalism Before the
Constitution, 1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 173, 197 (1998).
36. See Nathan S. Chapman, Forgotten Government-Missionary Partnerships: New Light
on the Establishment Clause (draft on file with author).
37. U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
38. Id. amend. I.
39. See generally THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE DRAFTS, DEBATES, SOURCES, AND
ORIGINS (Cogan ed., 1997).
40. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 84, at 442–51 (Alexander Hamilton) (Carey &
McClellan eds., 2001). For a thorough consideration of the relationship between ratification
of the Constitution and concern for a Bill of Rights, see generally PAULINE MAIER,
RATIFICATION: THE PEOPLE DEBATE THE CONSTITUTION, 1787–88 (2010).
41. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 453 (June 8, 1789) (Rep. Madison).
42. Id. at 766 (Aug. 15, 1789) (Rep. Madison).
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conceptions embodied in contemporary doctrine and practice.43 Some
constitutional rights, Campbell argues, were “natural rights.” People gave
them up for the public good.44 Legislatures (and in some cases juries), not
courts, assessed the extent to which the public good demanded an
infringement of the right. Others were “positive rights” based on past
political agreements (such as the right to jury trial) that limited the
sovereign’s authority.45 Courts would enforce these, but there was some
disagreement about whether courts should construe them narrowly to cover
only the paradigmatic governmental overreach, or should construe them
broadly to cover new, analogous acts.46 Campbell’s interpretation of the
history may be incorrect, but its plausibility illustrates how complicated and
shifting the evidentiary eddies can be.
The territorial and personal scope of constitutional rights is even more
difficult.47 At the time of the founding, numerous rules and principles under
the law of nations and the common law overlapped to reinforce an underlying
principle of reciprocal loyalty and protection. Subjects, including temporary
subjects within the sovereign’s territory peacefully, owed a duty of loyalty,
or obedience, to the sovereign; the sovereign had a reciprocal duty to provide
the protection of the law.48 In general, then, the result was that permanent
subjects (or citizens) of a sovereign were entitled to the sovereign’s
protection of law (or legal rights) wherever in the world they were. Resident
aliens who were the subject of a sovereign at peace with their host sovereign
also enjoyed this reciprocal relationship with their host. Enemy aliens
(including residents) and aliens outside the sovereign’s territory were not
entitled to the protection of the law.49
As Andrew Kent has argued, it is challenging to map this background law
onto constitutional rights.50 The Constitution simply does not mention these
norms, and some of the provisions of the Bill of Rights, especially the Fifth
Amendment, seem to provide absolute rights to all “person[s].” Kent chalks
this up to hasty and poor drafting and argues that the Constitution’s rights
provision should be constructed to incorporate the background principle of

43. See, e.g., Jud Campbell, Judicial Review and the Enumeration of Rights, 15 GEO. J. L.
& PUB. POL’Y 569 (2017) [hereinafter Campbell, Judicial Review]; Jud Campbell, Natural
Rights and the First Amendment, 127 YALE L.J. 246, 252 (2017) [hereinafter Campbell, First
Amendment]; Jud Campbell, Republicanism and Natural Rights at the Founding, 32 CONST.
COMM. 85 (2017).
44. Campbell, First Amendment, supra note 43, at 272–73; 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND IN FOUR BOOKS 125 (1953) (noting that natural
rights could be “so far restrained by human laws . . . as is necessary and expedient for the
general advantage of the public”).
45. Campbell, Judicial Review, supra note 43, at 577–78.
46. Id.
47. See generally Kent, supra note 2.
48. See generally Philip Hamburger, Beyond Protection, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1823
(2009).
49. See id.; see also Kent, supra note 4, at 507.
50. See generally Kent, supra note 2.
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reciprocal loyalty and protection.51 This is a sensible way to resolve the
issue.
Yet, as Kent concedes, it is not the only “plausible” approach.52 The rules
and principles of the law of nations and the common law that reinforced the
underlying principle of reciprocity could—and did—change over time.
Nations could depart from the principles of the law of nations, and courts
could determine when the norms under either source of law had changed.53
So the question is whether the provisions of the Bill of Rights should be
construed to have incorporated or to have changed the background principle
of reciprocity with respect to the rights they articulate. This question is
bound up with whether the Bill of Rights was understood to be a fresh source
of positive rights or simply a declaration of existing rights (natural and
positive).
For Wuerth’s case, added to this complexity is the uncertainty of the
historical relationship between jurisdiction over the person (or the rem) and
the requirement of due process of law. Stephen Sachs has recently argued
that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment probably was
understood to require personal jurisdiction, but only indirectly: it prohibited
courts from depriving parties of rights without first acquiring jurisdiction
over the person according to the general law, rather than creating a new
constitutional law of personal jurisdiction.54
Wuerth does not provide a thorough analysis of these tensions, but she
does argue that a construction of the historical territorial and personal scope
of a constitutional right should proceed one right at a time.55 This contrasts
with a categorical approach. Such an approach could take one of two forms.
The first would argue that the Bill of Rights incorporated the territorial and
personal jurisdiction rules of the common law and the law of nations circa
1791.56 This is analogous to the view that the Seventh Amendment
incorporates the civil jury requirements of the common law as of 1791; the
Constitution fixed the rules as of 1791, and those rules are now ours. The
second categorical approach would agree that the Constitution incorporated
the law of nations and common law jurisdictional norms, but would maintain
that, as those norms change over time, the Constitution’s jurisdictional reach

51. See id. at 772. See generally Kent, supra note 4.
52. Kent, supra note 2, at 769.
53. See, e.g., William S. Dodge, Customary International Law, Congress and the Courts:
Origins of the Later-in-Time Rule, in MAKING INTERNATIONAL LAW WORK IN THE GLOBAL
ECONOMY: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF DETLEV VAGTS 531, 534–35 (Bekker et al. eds., 2010)
(arguing that Americans would have agreed with Vattel that a nation could depart from the
“customary” law of nations, but not the “necessary” or “voluntary” law of nations, which were
based on natural law).
54. Stephen E. Sachs, Pennoyer Was Right, 95 TEX. L. REV. 1249 (2017); see also Wendy
Collins Perdue, What’s “Sovereignty” Got to Do with It?: Due Process, Personal
Jurisdiction, and the Supreme Court, 63 S.C. L. REV. 729, 732 (2012).
55. Wuerth, supra note 5, at 686.
56. See generally Kent, supra note 4; Hamburger, supra note 48.
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changes alongside them.57 On this view, the Constitution’s relationship to
the law of nations is both categorical and dynamic.
I am on Wuerth’s side. This is for several reasons, only some of which
sound in the current academic manifestation of originalism. Most
importantly, as mentioned above, constitutional argumentation gives pride of
place to constitutional text. The focus on text is not exclusive, of course, but
it is central. One implication is that interpreters/constructors should show
care for linguistic details, including differences, across constitutional
provisions. Such differences are rarely determinative, but they do bear legal
meaning, at least in that they render some constructions more or less
plausible. For instance, the Fifth Amendment’s use of “person” and the
Eighth Amendment’s absolute prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment
both suggest a broad application across categories of people.58 The Second
and Fourth Amendments, by contrast, refer to the rights of “the people,”
which may signal a narrower group of beneficiaries.59 Perhaps these are
differences of style or careless drafting (they cannot be both). But given the
priority of text in the tradition and contemporary practice of constitutional
interpretation, constructions that downplay those differences should bear the
burden of showing that they are meaningless.
Second, constitutional argumentation during the early republic strongly
suggests that Americans responsible for decision-making were comfortable
advancing an array of arguments about the territorial and personal scope of
constitutional rights, including arguments that did not map precisely onto
background norms from the common law and customary international law.
Central and territorial officials bickered about the application of
constitutional limits to territorial governments.60 During the quasi-war with
France, congressmen advanced diverse arguments about the application of
the Bill of Rights to foreigners, including resident (quasi-)enemies.61 They
had to navigate not only ambiguity about the meaning and substance of
rights, but also ambiguity about the relationship between common law
principles and constitutional norms. During the War of 1812, American
decision-makers such as Chancellor Kent and Chief Justice Marshall showed
a willingness to apply new principles of the general law to protect resident
enemy aliens.62 As a matter of black letter law today, many questions about
the territorial and personal scope of constitutional rights remain unresolved.63

57. See, e.g., William S. Dodge, Customary International Law, Change, and the
Constitution, 106 GEO. L.J. 1559, 1585 (2018).
58. U.S. CONST. amends. V, VIII.
59. Id. amends. II, IV; see also Wuerth, supra note 5, at 688.
60. Gregory Ablavsky, Administrative Constitutionalism in the Northwest Territory, 167
U. PA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 37) (on file with author).
61. See, e.g., DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: THE FEDERALIST
PERIOD, 1789–1801, at 256–58 (1997); Gerald Neuman, Whose Constitution?, 100 YALE L.J.
909, 927–43 (1991).
62. See Chapman, supra note 4, at 651–54, 699–701.
63. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Mesa, 137 S. Ct. 2003 (2017).
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Decision-makers, especially courts, proceed one case at a time, reluctant to
make sweeping generalizations.64
Third, there is little reason to think that questions about the territorial or
personal scope of constitutional rights should be constructed any differently
than the scope of federal power in general. There seems to be little dispute
that separation of powers and federalism provisions apply to the federal
government, regardless of where or over whom it exercises its power.65
Indeed, some of those provisions are essential for understanding the contours
of federal power over places outside the states. Over the District of
Columbia, for instance, Congress has the power to “exercise exclusive
Legislation in all Cases whatsoever.”66 In other places, Congress’s power is
limited by enumeration, including the Necessary and Proper Clause.67
During the early republic, many jurists, including John Marshall, presumed
that Congress, though subject to implicit and express constitutional limits,
was not restricted by the customary law of nations or the common law.68 If
the law of nations did not limit the federal government’s power, why would
it limit the constitutional limits of that power? Decision-makers ascertain the
territorial and personal scope of constitutional powers one power at a time;
they should do the same with the express limits on those powers.
Indeed, the express limits in the original Constitution of 1789 seem to
suggest territorial and personal diversity. Consider the following examples
from Section 9 of Article I (where Madison originally planned to locate the
Bill of Rights). The last clause prohibits officers of the United States from
accepting emoluments, offices, or titles “from any King, Prince, or foreign
State.”69 One obvious application of this provision is to U.S. ambassadors
subject to corruption by their host (or another) nation. This purpose would
be undermined if the clause did not apply extraterritorially. The third clause,
which prohibits bills of attainder and ex post facto laws, speaks categorically:
none of them “shall be passed.”70 Under the view that the Constitution
incorporated background jurisdictional norms of the common law and the
law of nations, this provision would not apply to legislative acts against an
enemy alien or any nonresident alien, including a corporation. Perhaps this
is correct, but it has a high textual hurdle to clear.
The Bill of Attainder Clause is not merely a limit on the federal
government as a whole; it is a limit on Congress’s authority to enact a certain
sort of law. The reason that many in the founding generation gave for the
prohibition is that such laws confound the separation of the legislative,
64. See, e.g., United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 275 (1990) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
65. See, e.g., Bank Markazi v. Peterson, 136 S.Ct. 1310 (2016) (holding that a statute
affecting the property of the Bank of Iran did not violate separation of powers).
66. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17.
67. See generally McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819).
68. See, e.g., Murray v. The Charming Betsey, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64 (1804); William S.
Dodge, The New Presumption Against Extraterritoriality, 133 HARV. L. REV. (forthcoming
2019) (manuscript at 77) (on file with the author).
69. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 8.
70. Id. at cl. 3.
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executive, and judicial functions—they pronounce guilt and punishment
without the application of prior law by an independent court.71 As Americans
often put it, such laws purport to deprive persons of their rights without due
process of law.72
None of this requires the conclusion that the Due Process Clause was
understood to protect resident enemy aliens, foreigners abroad, or, for that
matter, foreign states. But it does complicate an easy division between
constitutional limits sounding in separation of powers and federalism and
those sounding in individual rights. Many American jurists believed that
such restrictions were intertwined and mutually reinforcing. Whether they
are best construed to have incorporated, or to have entrenched, law-ofnations and common law territorial and personal limits is a case-by-case
question.
This history suggests something further: declarations of the “original
meaning” or “original understanding” of the personal and territorial scope of
constitutional provisions, especially rights, should be modestly held. In
important respects, there was no original understanding at all. There is a text
and historical context that provide premises for constitutional argumentation.
Jurists today, no less than decision-makers two hundred years ago, rely on
those legal materials to construct plausible, even persuasive, legal meanings
for the purpose of answering specific, often anachronistic, legal questions.
This is precisely what Wuerth has done and many other scholars routinely
do.73
Yet the construction of the territorial and personal scope of constitutional
rights, because it requires facility with so many competing historical and
contemporary literatures, represents the far edge of lawyerly historical
synthesis. This calls for an extra measure of modesty. It also calls for an
extra measure of deference to contrary constructions by historical decisionmakers in the legislative, executive, or judicial branch. Perhaps the most
defensible grammar for such arguments is that the original text and history
“support” one construction or another, rather than that they “show” that the
Constitution has this or that meaning.
B. Privileging the Methods of Decision-Makers
This leads to a final point about methodology. Originalists disagree about
whose “understanding” of the text ought to matter for contemporary
construction—the framers, the ratifiers, a literate member of the general
71. See Chapman & McConnell, Due Process as Separation of Powers, 121 YALE L.J.
1672, 1781–82 (2012). This is why Bank Markazi v. Peterson, 136 S. Ct. 1310 (2016), was a
close case. Congress conditioned the property rights of the Bank of Iran on a finding by a
federal court in a pending case. Id. at 1317. The Supreme Court held, over a dissent by Chief
Justice Roberts and Justice Sotomayor, that Congress had not violated the separation of
powers. Id. A legislative act purporting to directly take Iran’s money and assign it to the
plaintiffs, however, would have. And Iran would have had the right to contest such a
deprivation under the Due Process Clause. See Chapman & McConnell, supra.
72. See generally id.
73. See generally Wuerth, supra note 5.
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public, lawyers, etc. I have suggested that Wuerth’s argument depends
principally on sources of authority and forms of reasoning that have been the
stock-in-trade of constitutional argumentation from the beginning of the
republic. I think this is the right approach. In the terms of originalist
methodological literature, it bears the closest affinity to the “original legal
methods” approach.74
Throughout this response, I have referred to constitutional “decisionmakers.” By this, I have meant to suggest that the arguments advanced and
found persuasive by those with special responsibility for making
constitutional decisions ought to have added weight. This is so for two
reasons in addition to the notion that “the” original meaning of the text is
whatever lawyers would have made of it.
First, decision-makers have always been, and are today, under oath to
support the Constitution. Whatever else the oath may do, it at least has the
possibility to uniquely pique the decision-maker’s conscience, providing an
extra guarantee of good faith constitutional construction.75 Second, relying
on conventional legal materials and conventional forms of legal reasoning is
how American decision-makers have always interpreted, constructed, and
applied the Constitution. There is long tradition of privileging certain kinds
of constitutional argumentation, and this tradition has its own normative
weight in addition to whatever the first generation of constitutional
interpreters may have done.76 Put differently, Wuerth has engaged in an
original form of constitutional argumentation, whether she has come up with
“the” original meaning of the Constitution or not.
CONCLUSION
I have meant to support the most important aspects of Wuerth’s approach
to resolving a specific constitutional question. She relies on conventional
textual and historical arguments. So do many other scholars who study the
Constitution’s provisions touching on foreign affairs. Yet she, like most
other foreign affairs scholars, offers little justification for this
methodology.77 Perhaps none is needed. Or perhaps scholars eschew
“originalist” methods for their perceived political taint or intellectual
shortcomings. What I have suggested here, however, is that there are good
reasons for precisely the way she has gone about her work. Some of them
74. See generally John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Original Methods
Originalism: A New Theory of Interpretation and the Case Against Construction, 103 NW. U.
L. REV. 751 (2009); John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Unifying Original Intent and
Original Public Meaning, 113 NW. U. L. REV. 1371 (2019).
75. Evan D. Bernick & Christopher R. Green, What Is the Object of the Article VI Oath?
(forthcoming); Richard M. Re, Promising the Constitution, 110 NW. U. L. REV. 299, 299
(2016). See generally H. JEFFERSON POWELL, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSCIENCE: THE MORAL
DIMENSION OF JUDICIAL DECISION (2008).
76. See, e.g., H. JEFFERSON POWELL, THE MORAL TRADITION OF AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONALISM: A THEOLOGICAL INTERPRETATION (1993).
77. See generally id. There are, of course, exceptions. See supra note 8 and accompanying
text.
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are highlighted by originalist methodology. Some of them may be anathema
to many originalists. But all of them, I would suggest, are consonant with an
enduring tradition of constitutional construction—even on matters of foreign
affairs.

